The abortion debate refers to discussion and controversy surrounding the moral and legal status of abortion. The two main groups involved in the abortion debate are the pro-choice movement, which generally supports access to abortion and regards it as morally permissible, and the pro-life movement, which generally opposes access to abortion and regards it as morally wrong. Each movement has, with varying results, sought to influence public opinion and to attain legal support for its position. In Canada, for example, abortion is available on demand,[1] while in Nicaragua abortions are always illegal. In the USA, abortion is generally legal but subject to restrictions in some jurisdictions and circumstances. In some cases, the abortion debate has led to the use of violence.
Many of the terms used in the debate are seen as political framing: terms used to validate one's own stance while invalidating the opposition's. For example, the labels "pro-choice" and "pro-life" imply endorsement of widely held values such as liberty and freedom, while suggesting that the opposition must be "anti-choice" or "anti-life" (alternatively "pro-coercion" or "pro-death"). Such terms gloss over the underlying issue of which choice or life is being considered and whose choice or what kind of life is deemed most important.
Appeals are often made in the abortion debate to the alleged "rights" of the fetus, pregnant woman or other parties. Such appeals can generate confusion if the type of rights is not specified (whether civil, natural, or otherwise), or if it is simply assumed that the right appealed to takes precedence over all other competing rights (an example of begging the question).
The appropriate terms with which to designate the human organism prior to birth are also debated. The terms "embryo" and "fetus" are seen by pro-life advocates as dehumanizing; the terms "baby" and "unborn child" are seen by pro-choice advocates as emotionalized. Likewise, there is debate between use of the terms "woman" and "mother".
Church and state
The separation of church and state is an oft-debated topic in connection with abortion. Many churches have official positions on abortion, and there is a correlation between these official positions and the personal positions of adherents. Religious influences are closely tied to ethical opposition to abortion.[13] Some argue that efforts to codify official church positions (particularly pro-life positions) are an illegal or unjust breach of separation, either because those positions are innately religious or on the basis that separation of church and state should include separation of religion from politics.[14] Some argue that restrictions on abortion are not a breach of separation, since the pro-life position can be defended by appeal to secular ethical arguments.[15] It has also been argued that churches have an important role to play in political life, since in some communities they are an important source of information, resources, and incentives to engage in the political process.[16]
Personhood
Some argue that abortion is morally wrong on the basis that a fetus is an innocent human being.[17] Others reject this position by drawing a distinction between human being and human person, arguing that while the fetus is innocent and biologically human, it is not a person with a right to life.[18] In support of this distinction, some propose a list of criteria as markers of personhood. For example, Mary Ann Warren suggests consciousness (at least the capacity to feel pain), reasoning, self motivation, the ability to communicate, and self-awareness.[19] According to Warren, a being need not exhibit all of these criteria to qualify as a person with a right to life, but if a being exhibits none of them (or perhaps only one), then it is certainly not a person. Warren concludes that as the fetus satisfies only one criterion, consciousness (and this only after it becomes susceptible to pain),[20] the fetus is not a person and abortion is therefore morally permissible. Other philosophers apply similar criteria, concluding that a fetus lacks a right to life because it lacks self-consciousness,[21] rationality,[22] and autonomy.[23] These lists diverge over precisely which features confer a right to life,[24] but tend to propose various developed psychological features not found in fetuses.
Critics of this position typically argue that the proposed criteria for personhood would disqualify two classes of born human beings — reversibly comatose patients, and human infants — from having a right to life, since they, like fetuses, are not self-conscious, do not communicate, and so on.[25] Defenders of the proposed criteria may respond that the reversibly comatose do satisfy the relevant criteria because they "retain all their unconscious mental states".[26] Warren concedes that infants are not "persons" by her proposed criteria,[27] and on that basis she and others concede that infanticide could be morally acceptable under some circumstances (for example if the infant is severely disabled[28] or in order to save the lives of several other infants[29]). Critics may see such concessions as an indication that the right to life cannot be adequately defined by reference to developed psychological features.
An alternate approach is to base personhood or the right to life on a being's natural or inherent capacities. On this approach, a being essentially has a right to life if it has a genetic propensity or natural capacity to develop the relevant psychological features; and, since human beings do have this natural capacity, they essentially have a right to life (beginning at conception or whenever they come into existence).[30] Critics of this position argue that mere genetic potential is not a plausible basis for respect (or for the right to life), and that basing a right to life on natural capacities would lead to the counterintuitive position that anencephalic infants, irreversibly comatose patients, and brain-dead patients kept alive on a medical ventilator, are all persons with a right to life.[31]
Deprivation
Some argue that abortion is morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future.[32] On this account, killing an adult human being is wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours—a future containing highly valuable or desirable experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.[33] If a being has such a future, then (according to the argument) killing that being would seriously harm it and hence would be seriously wrong.[34] But since a fetus does have such a future, the "overwhelming majority" of deliberate abortions are placed in the "same moral category" as killing an innocent adult human being.[35] Not all abortions are unjustified according to this argument: abortion would be justified if the same justification could be applied to killing an adult human.
Criticism of this line of reasoning follows several threads. Some reject the argument on grounds relating to personal identity, holding that the fetus is not the same entity as the adult into which it will develop, and thus that the fetus does not have a "future like ours" in the required sense.[36] Others grant that the fetus has a future like ours, but argue that being deprived of this future is not a significant harm or a significant wrong to the fetus, because there are relatively few psychological connections (continuations of memory, belief, desire and the like) between the fetus as it is now and the adult into which it will develop.[37] Another criticism is that the argument creates inequalities in the wrongness of killing:[38] as the futures of some people (for example the young, bright and healthy) appear to be far more valuable or desirable than the futures of other people (for example the old, depressed and sick), the argument appears to entail that some killings are far more wrong than others, or that some people have a far stronger right to life than others—a conclusion that is taken to be counterintuitive or unacceptable. Finally, some argue that as gametes have a similar potential to the fetus, the argument would entail that contraception is as wrong as the killing of an adult human being—a conclusion that is similarly taken to be counterintuitive or unacceptable.
Many of the terms used in the debate are seen as political framing: terms used to validate one's own stance while invalidating the opposition's. For example, the labels "pro-choice" and "pro-life" imply endorsement of widely held values such as liberty and freedom, while suggesting that the opposition must be "anti-choice" or "anti-life" (alternatively "pro-coercion" or "pro-death"). Such terms gloss over the underlying issue of which choice or life is being considered and whose choice or what kind of life is deemed most important.
Appeals are often made in the abortion debate to the alleged "rights" of the fetus, pregnant woman or other parties. Such appeals can generate confusion if the type of rights is not specified (whether civil, natural, or otherwise), or if it is simply assumed that the right appealed to takes precedence over all other competing rights (an example of begging the question).
The appropriate terms with which to designate the human organism prior to birth are also debated. The terms "embryo" and "fetus" are seen by pro-life advocates as dehumanizing; the terms "baby" and "unborn child" are seen by pro-choice advocates as emotionalized. Likewise, there is debate between use of the terms "woman" and "mother".
Church and state
The separation of church and state is an oft-debated topic in connection with abortion. Many churches have official positions on abortion, and there is a correlation between these official positions and the personal positions of adherents. Religious influences are closely tied to ethical opposition to abortion.[13] Some argue that efforts to codify official church positions (particularly pro-life positions) are an illegal or unjust breach of separation, either because those positions are innately religious or on the basis that separation of church and state should include separation of religion from politics.[14] Some argue that restrictions on abortion are not a breach of separation, since the pro-life position can be defended by appeal to secular ethical arguments.[15] It has also been argued that churches have an important role to play in political life, since in some communities they are an important source of information, resources, and incentives to engage in the political process.[16]
Personhood
Some argue that abortion is morally wrong on the basis that a fetus is an innocent human being.[17] Others reject this position by drawing a distinction between human being and human person, arguing that while the fetus is innocent and biologically human, it is not a person with a right to life.[18] In support of this distinction, some propose a list of criteria as markers of personhood. For example, Mary Ann Warren suggests consciousness (at least the capacity to feel pain), reasoning, self motivation, the ability to communicate, and self-awareness.[19] According to Warren, a being need not exhibit all of these criteria to qualify as a person with a right to life, but if a being exhibits none of them (or perhaps only one), then it is certainly not a person. Warren concludes that as the fetus satisfies only one criterion, consciousness (and this only after it becomes susceptible to pain),[20] the fetus is not a person and abortion is therefore morally permissible. Other philosophers apply similar criteria, concluding that a fetus lacks a right to life because it lacks self-consciousness,[21] rationality,[22] and autonomy.[23] These lists diverge over precisely which features confer a right to life,[24] but tend to propose various developed psychological features not found in fetuses.
Critics of this position typically argue that the proposed criteria for personhood would disqualify two classes of born human beings — reversibly comatose patients, and human infants — from having a right to life, since they, like fetuses, are not self-conscious, do not communicate, and so on.[25] Defenders of the proposed criteria may respond that the reversibly comatose do satisfy the relevant criteria because they "retain all their unconscious mental states".[26] Warren concedes that infants are not "persons" by her proposed criteria,[27] and on that basis she and others concede that infanticide could be morally acceptable under some circumstances (for example if the infant is severely disabled[28] or in order to save the lives of several other infants[29]). Critics may see such concessions as an indication that the right to life cannot be adequately defined by reference to developed psychological features.
An alternate approach is to base personhood or the right to life on a being's natural or inherent capacities. On this approach, a being essentially has a right to life if it has a genetic propensity or natural capacity to develop the relevant psychological features; and, since human beings do have this natural capacity, they essentially have a right to life (beginning at conception or whenever they come into existence).[30] Critics of this position argue that mere genetic potential is not a plausible basis for respect (or for the right to life), and that basing a right to life on natural capacities would lead to the counterintuitive position that anencephalic infants, irreversibly comatose patients, and brain-dead patients kept alive on a medical ventilator, are all persons with a right to life.[31]
Deprivation
Some argue that abortion is morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future.[32] On this account, killing an adult human being is wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours—a future containing highly valuable or desirable experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.[33] If a being has such a future, then (according to the argument) killing that being would seriously harm it and hence would be seriously wrong.[34] But since a fetus does have such a future, the "overwhelming majority" of deliberate abortions are placed in the "same moral category" as killing an innocent adult human being.[35] Not all abortions are unjustified according to this argument: abortion would be justified if the same justification could be applied to killing an adult human.
Criticism of this line of reasoning follows several threads. Some reject the argument on grounds relating to personal identity, holding that the fetus is not the same entity as the adult into which it will develop, and thus that the fetus does not have a "future like ours" in the required sense.[36] Others grant that the fetus has a future like ours, but argue that being deprived of this future is not a significant harm or a significant wrong to the fetus, because there are relatively few psychological connections (continuations of memory, belief, desire and the like) between the fetus as it is now and the adult into which it will develop.[37] Another criticism is that the argument creates inequalities in the wrongness of killing:[38] as the futures of some people (for example the young, bright and healthy) appear to be far more valuable or desirable than the futures of other people (for example the old, depressed and sick), the argument appears to entail that some killings are far more wrong than others, or that some people have a far stronger right to life than others—a conclusion that is taken to be counterintuitive or unacceptable. Finally, some argue that as gametes have a similar potential to the fetus, the argument would entail that contraception is as wrong as the killing of an adult human being—a conclusion that is similarly taken to be counterintuitive or unacceptable.
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